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The economic theory set forth by John Maynard Keynes 
recommends deliberate government intervention in the 
economy to avert the crises of effective demand that are 
inherent to the dynamic of monetary economies.
Since the 1970s, several authors have endeavoured 
to retrieve the economic policy prescriptions contained 
in Keynes’ works, including Davidson (1972 and 1982); 
Minsky (1982 and 1986); Kregel (1985 and 1994-1995), 
and Carvalho (1992). In addition to correcting the mistaken 
interpretation of Keynesian economic-policy proposals, 
which mainstream thought has inadvertently confused 
with easy-money policies and budget deficits, the present 
article emphasizes the relevance of his proposals today.
Against that backdrop, this article first describes 
Keynes’ policy proposals, particularly regarding monetary, 
fiscal and exchange-rate policies. It then briefly reviews 
the economic policies implemented in Brazil since the 
introduction of the Real Plan in July 1994 and, more 
specifically, in the period following the international 
financial crisis of 2007-2008. The aim here is to analyse 
the Brazilian economy during that period in terms of the 
operating rationale of Keynesian macroeconomic policy.
The article is organized in four sections, including 
this introduction. Section II describes monetary, fiscal and 
exchange-rate policies from the Keynesian perspective. 
Based on the theoretical framework described, section 
III establishes whether the macroeconomic policies 
implemented between 1995 and 2009, including those 
applied during the international financial crisis, constitute 




the monetary, fiscal and exchange-rate policies 
proposed by Keynes
In general, the cyclical instability of output and employment 
levels was always one of Keynes’ basic concerns (Ferrari 
Filho, 2006a), and he believed that the problem of 
fluctuations ultimately stems from the fact that “a monetary 
economy [...] is essentially one in which changing views 
about the future are capable of influencing the quantity 
of employment…” (Keynes, 1964, p. 4).
Keynes defined capitalist economies as 
“entrepreneurial economies or monetary production 
economies”. The defining characteristic of a monetary 
economy is that money serves not only as a means 
of exchange but as an asset with capacity to provide 
protection from changes in economic agents’ expectations, 
or “changing views about the future”, since it represents 
an inter-temporal claim on social wealth and possesses 
maximum liquidity to finance both spot transactions and 
contracts requiring payments in the future. Depending on 
how entrepreneurs’ liquidity preference (in other words the 
demand for money) is constrained by their expectations 
about the future, they will make substitutions between 
different forms of wealth holding, either increasing or 
decreasing the demand for reproducible assets and, thus, 
increasing or decreasing the income generated by new 
production (Carvalho, 1994, p. 47). 
With the aim of restraining such “changing views 
about the future” held by those capable of controlling 
economic activity, namely entrepreneurs, Keynes set forth 
a new social philosophy to resolve “the outstanding faults 
of the economic society in which we live [...] [in other 
words,] its failure to provide for full employment and 
its arbitrary and inequitable distribution of wealth and 
incomes” (Keynes, 1964, p. 372). In that regard, while 
describing the implications of his theory as “moderately 
conservative”, Keynes claimed that: 
“The state will have to exercise a guiding influence on 
the propensity to consume partly through its scheme of 
taxation, partly by fixing the rate of interest, and partly, 
perhaps, in other ways. […] I conceive, therefore, 
that a somewhat comprehensive socialization of 
investment will prove the only means of securing 
an approximation of full employment; though this 
need not exclude all manner of compromises and of 
devices by which public authority will co-operate 
with private initiative“ (Keynes, 1964, p. 378).
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The guiding influence needed from the State, 
as proposed by Keynes, was expressed through what 
ultimately defines the economic goal of any social 
system: politics. Keynes (cited in Minsky, 1986, p. 8) 
defines the political problem as follows:
“The political problem of mankind is to combine 
three things: economic efficiency, social justice 
and individual liberty. The first needs criticism, 
precaution and technical knowledge; the second, 
an unselfish and enthusiastic spirit which loves 
the ordinary man; the third, tolerance, breadth, 
appreciation of the excellencies of variety and 
independence, which prefers to give unhindered 
opportunities to the exceptional and to the aspiring”.
Carvalho (2008) argues that Keynesian economic 
policy is characterized by a principle not of allocation, 
but of mobilization. Its objective is first and foremost 
to mobilize resources that are not expanding effective 
demand and are therefore disappointing the expectations 
of entrepreneurs — agents who are responsible for 
creating employment and wealth in society.
According to Keynes, the policy of mobilizing 
resources to generate effective demand involves nothing 
more than the set of conventional macroeconomic 
policies —monetary and fiscal and, in an open economy 
context, exchange-rate policies— since microeconomic 
policies can give rise to distortions, privileges and 
inefficiencies. Acting in the more generalized domain of 
macroeconomics would allow the widest possible scope 
for private initiative, thereby avoiding the concentration 
of opportunities and incomes. It would also be possible 
to socialize the risks of frustrated expectations, and 
thus protect workers from large-scale layoffs. Keynes 
highlights the roles of monetary, fiscal and exchange-
rate policies for this purpose.
Monetary policy would be used to align the relative 
prices of investment assets in the economic system, by 
managing the interest rate in the economy. Keynes (1964, 
pp. 225-226) argues that all assets have an intrinsic rate 
of interest, which is equivalent to their yield. When 
comparing the various yields on the assets available for 
choice, economic agents may judge it preferable —in 
terms of liquidity, carrying cost and quasi-rent— to 
channel their resources into assets that do not generate 
an expansion of economic activity—particularly when 
the productive investments made in the past have resulted 
in excessive inventories and frustrated expectations.
The basic interest rate set by the monetary authority 
should be widely publicized and held at a level considered 
normal, in accordance with the habits and customs of 
the public, because, as Carvalho (1999, p. 275) points 
out, people have expectations as to the normal rate of 
interest and expect current rates to tend towards this. 
Accordingly, when the future is unknown, economic 
agents will always attempt to foresee the rate of interest 
and monitor it closely to avoid incurring high investment 
opportunity costs.
Carvalho (1994, pp. 43-44) provides an example of 
how monetary policy affects the way economic agents 
manage their portfolio composition. According to the author,
[it is] in this sense that the inverted pyramid that 
characterizes the Keynesian vision of the relation 
between money and other financial assets is 
constructed […] at the vertex is legal tender, 
and the other assets are supported on that vertex 
in successive layers, each one defined by the 
institutional arrangements that establish rules 
of convertibility between the groups […] and by 
the relation between the yields obtained on each 
collection of assets.
The relation between the different assets and money 
itself means that monetary policy plays an important 
role in the economic dynamic. Its influence on effective 
demand is indirect, initially affecting liquidity conditions 
in the money market, and subsequently motivating 
economic agents’ decisions. Thus, if the government 
authorities wish to expand the volume of capital in 
society, they should lower the rate of interest to stimulate 
productive investments. In addition, keeping the interest 
rate at levels compatible with eliminating capital scarcity 
would result in “euthanasia of the rentier”, a class that 
is not remunerated for its “risk and the exercise of skill 
and judgment”, but by “exploiting the scarcity value of 
capital “ (Keynes, 1964, pp. 375-376).
Nonetheless, there are times when monetary policy 
does little to stabilize the dynamic cycles of monetary 
economies, since its capacity to stimulate effective 
demand diminishes when uncertainty about the future 
leads both consumers and investors to hoard money 
instead of spending it, regardless of the interest rate 
set by the monetary authority. In that situation, which 
is common at times of economic crisis, the “liquidity 
trap” phenomenon operates and money’s store-of-value 
function is what agents desire. As the interest rate acts 
indirectly on the economic system and sometimes has 
only minor effects on agents’ liquidity preference and 
effective demand, Keynes (1980a) writes: 
“... It’s not quite correct that I attach primary 
importance to the rate of interest. What I attach 
primary importance to is the scale of investment and 
am interested in the low interest rate as one of the 
elements furthering this.” (Keynes, 1980a, p. 350).
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In those circumstances, government intervention 
essentially takes the form of fiscal policy, based on public 
expenditure management —which is wholly different 
from the public deficit— and on tax policy.
The primary objective of tax policy is to make it 
possible to redistribute income that is shared unequally, 
by taxing either income or inheritance. Second, by 
expanding the State’s spending capacity, tax policy makes 
it possible to boost aggregate demand in the economic 
system. Lastly, as Keynes (1972) points out, it can also 
increase disposable income, by promoting an expansion 
of effective demand.
In Keynes’ original view, public expenditure 
management involves formulating two budgets: the ordinary 
(current) budget and the capital budget.1 The ordinary 
budget encompasses the resources needed to maintain 
the basic public services supplied by the government, 
such as public health, education, urban infrastructure, 
national defence and social security. Although, as Kregel 
(1985) notes, Keynes believed in the importance of those 
current expenditures, particularly social security transfers, 
as automatic stabilizers of business cycles, the ordinary 
budget should always be in surplus or, at least, balanced.
As an example of his concern for a balanced budget, 
in the debates held in the United Kingdom on the social 
security system to be constructed after World War II, 
Keynes (1980a, pp. 204-205) argued that the system 
being envisaged would impose “a severe burden to 
meet simultaneously pensions against which no funds 
have been accumulated and to accumulate funds for 
future pensions”.2
The need to avoid public deficits in the ordinary 
budget stems from their repercussions in a monetary 
economy, including: 
(i) the creation of “dead-weight” debts, for which no 
funding source has been set up to finance their 
future payment;
(ii) pressure on the rate of interest in the economy, 
caused by the public sector’s demand for private 
savings to finance its deficits;
1 Keynes’ descriptions of budgetary policy can be found in chapter 
5 of volume XXVII of the Collected Writings of John Maynard 
Keynes, entitled “Employment Policy”. These were debated with 
various interlocutors in relation to the problems that United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland would face after World War II, 
including the aim of full employment. For more on the subject, see 
Keynes (1980a, chapter. 5).
2 The debates were held in the Interdepartmental Committee on 
Social Insurance and Allied Services of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland, established in June 1941, and took place 
mainly between Keynes and commission president William Beveridge. 
For more on the subject see Keynes (1980a, chapter. 4).
(iii) the risk that the State would be forced to contract new 
debt to pay off its previous obligations, depending 
on the pace of growth and profile of the debt in 
relation to economic growth and the increase in 
public revenues. 
In that context, Keynes writes, “it is probable that 
the amount of such surplus would fluctuate from year 
to year for the usual cases. But I should not aim at 
attempting to compensate cyclical fluctuations by means 
of the ordinary budget. I should leave this duty to the 
capital budget.” (Keynes 1980a, p. 278).
The capital budget defines public expenditure in terms 
of the productive investments made by the government 
to keep the economic system stable. Such investments 
should be undertaken by public or semi-public bodies, 
with the clear aim of regulating the economic cycle.3
The capital budget could be in deficit; but the deficit 
would be financed with the surpluses necessarily obtained 
in the ordinary budget. Thus, any debt generated by the 
capital budget deficit would stem not from government 
borrowing on financial markets, but from productive or 
semi-productive activities that would gradually replace 
the dead-weight debt (Keynes, 1980a, p. 277). 
It would be unwary to think of public expenditure 
under true Keynesian fiscal policy as a tool of last resort: 
it is not. The concept of “automatic stabilizer” is defined 
in Keynes’ own writings, as “a long-term programme 
of a stable character should be capable of reducing the 
potential range of fluctuation to much narrower limits” 
(Keynes, 1980a, p. 322).
Pursuing Keynes’ line of argument, the main task 
of the automatic stabilizer would thus be to prevent wide 
fluctuations by implementing a stable and continuous 
programme of long-term investments. In other words, its 
function would not be to rescue the economy from the 
peaks and troughs of the business cycle, but to prevent 
them from occurring. Moreover, once a long-term 
productive investment programme had been established, 
any short-term fluctuations could be more easily managed 
in the framework of that programme, either by bringing 
forward future measures in response to the first signs of 
insufficient effective demand, or by delaying investment 
projects in the capital budget when there are signs of 
excess aggregate demand.
3  According to Keynes (cited in Kregel, 1985, p. 37), semi-public 
bodies pursue the public good and “approximate more to the status of 
a public corporations than that of individualistic private enterprise”. 
Examples of such bodies would include “the universities, the Bank 
of England, the London Port Authority and joint-stock institutions”.
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Thus, measures to contain short-term fluctuations 
should not be restricted to promoting expansionary phases, 
but should also be adopted to head off episodes of excess 
aggregate demand. As Keynes (1972, p. 377-8) notes: 
“… It follows that the increased quantity of money 
available to be spent in the pockets of consumers 
will meet a quantity of goods which is not increased 
[...] with the result that there is nothing left to 
buy and the consumer goes home with the money 
burning his pocket [...] Some means must be found 
for withdrawing purchasing power from the market; 
or prices must rise until the available goods are 
selling at figures which absorb the increased 
quantity of expenditure — in other words the 
method of inflation.” 
By promoting productive institutions, the capital 
budget generates its own surplus through time. To 
keep public finances in overall balance, it suffices to 
avoid incurring current deficits, because any short-term 
imbalances in the capital budget would be financed with 
surpluses from the ordinary budget, and the returns 
obtained from the public investments made will tend to 
balance the capital budget in the long run. As Keynes 
(1980a, p. 320) put it, the “capital expenditure would, 
at least partially, if not wholly, pay for itself”.
The possibility of equilibrium in the long-term 
capital budget makes the public-sector budget as a 
whole much more rational and viable, by fostering the 
generation of surpluses through time and thus promoting 
public saving in both halves of the Keynesian budget. 
This reduces the possibility of incurring budget deficits 
which, as Keynes confirms, would occur if the volume of 
planned investment fails to produce equilibrium. In such 
conditions, and only then, the “lack of balance would 
be met by unbalancing one way or the other the current 
budget.” Nonetheless, “this would be a last resort, only 
to come into play if the machinery of capital budgeting 
had broken down” (Keynes, 1980a, p. 352).
To dispel any doubts as to his true intention in 
prescribing operating modes for fiscal policy, Keynes 
also argues that one should not confuse the fundamental 
idea of the capital budget with the particular —and rather 
desperate— expedient of deficit financing (Keynes, 
1980a, pp. 353-354).
The fundamental role assigned to investment 
spending in terms of the dynamic of aggregate demand 
in the Keynesian perspective, focuses on three aspects 
in particular. First, the stock of wealth accumulated in 
society depends essentially on investment decisions, 
which mobilize idle resources such as machinery, 
equipment, and particularly human labour. Second, as 
noted by Carvalho (2008), the initial increase in wealth, 
which results from resources being transferred from one 
individual to others in the act of investment, can generate 
a circuit of spending and, consequently, increase income 
further through the multiplier effect. And, lastly, Keynes 
(1980a, p. 350) explains why he would prefer a “heavy 
scale of investment to increasing consumption”, the 
main reason being that he thought we had yet to even 
approach the point of capital saturation.
The public investments funded from the capital 
budget should not rival private-sector investments, but 
complement them (Carvalho, 1999).4 The former should 
function as inducers par excellence of the latter, and 
thus stabilize the cyclical fluctuations of the economic 
system. Moreover, as agents’ expectations are the system’s 
destabilizing factor, fiscal policy in the form of investment 
expenditure should act on those expectations. To make 
this absolutely clear, Keynes develops the notion of the 
capital budget so that the productive investor can rely 
on the commitment of government action.
In short, in an uncertain world, where economic 
agents put their potential command over social wealth 
at risk for the purpose of obtaining greater command in 
the future, fiscal policy should be robust, to underpin a 
path of increasing wealth, and thus promote investors’ 
expectations. In that regard, Minsky (1986, p. 6) argues 
that “if the market mechanism is to function well, we 
must arrange to constrain the uncertainty due to business 
cycles so that the expectations that guide investment can 
reflect a vision of tranquil progress.”
In the case of exchange-rate policy, Keynes’ proposals 
envisage the operation of a managed exchange-rate 
system, to ensure both external balance and price stability. 
Keynes makes that idea clear in his International Clearing 
Union proposal for reorganizing the world economic 
order at the end of World War II. In that proposal, which 
included a system of exchange rates that were fixed but 
alterable according to circumstances, he defines one of 
the objectives as reducing uncertainty about the future 
prices of assets and tradable goods when economic agents 
have to make decisions involving foreign-exchange 
contracts (Ferrari Filho, 2006b, chapter 3).
Keynes also stressed that the external dynamic of 
monetary economies could not do without tools that 
would promote symmetrical adjustment in countries’ 
trading and financial relations. On this point, Keynes 
4  It should also be noted that capital-budget decisions should be related 
to what, technically speaking, are “social investments”—decisions 
which, if not taken by the government, will not be taken by anyone 
else (Kregel, 1985, p. 37).
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proposed creating an “international market maker” which 
would: (i) issue a universally accepted currency; (ii) 
provide conditions under which trade balances would be 
automatically adjusted, so that deficit countries would 
not be forced to attract capital to finance their balance 
of payments; (iii) define foreign-exchange management 
rules; and (iv) institute capital-control mechanisms.5
Three of the four objectives of the “international 
market maker” (automatic adjustment of trade imbalances, 
implementation of a managed exchange rate, and the 
adoption of capital-control mechanisms) play two 
fundamental roles for Keynes: (i) they reduce the 
uncertainty of business expectations; and (ii) they 
provide greater freedom to implement monetary policy, 
by obstructing pass-through effects from the exchange 
rate to domestic prices, and preventing the interest rate 
being used constantly to attract speculative capital from 
abroad, which could inhibit productive investments. In 
5 In the words of Keynes (1980b, p. 270) “to provide that money 
earned by selling goods to one country can be spent on purchasing 
the products of any other country. […] we cannot hope to balance 
our trading account if the surpluses we earn in one country cannot be 
applied to meet our requirements in another country.”
short, through exchange-rate policy, Keynes aimed to 
establish inter-temporal equilibrium in external accounts 
and allow monetary policy the greatest possible autonomy.
As noted by Marcuzzo (2005, p. 2), Keynes’ theory 
constantly recommends what should be done to underpin 
the level of investment, in the sense of “stabilizing 
business confidence”, rather than as a debt-financed 
public-works plan. This reflects the fact that Keynes’ 
trust in the “socialization of investments”, rather than in 
a fiscal policy aimed at smoothing consumption levels 
over the business cycle, reveals his concern for the size 
of the deficit and the importance of providing market 
incentives to achieve the desired level of employment 
(Marcuzzo, 2005, p. 2). 
Lastly, it shows that, in both conception and 
implementation, Keynesian economic policy aims to 
maintain levels of effective demand, to mitigate involuntary 
unemployment by stabilizing business expectations. 
Ultimately, the outcome pursued with Keynesian 
economic policies is the construction of a society that 
enjoys economic efficiency, social justice and individual 
freedom. Keeping that idea in mind, section III of this 
article analyses the conduct of macroeconomic policies 
in Brazil during the period following the Real Plan.
III 
review of economic policy in the period  
1995-2009 from a Keynesian perspective
1.  the rationale of the real plan and implementation 
of monetary, fiscal and exchange-rate policies 
As is well-known, the Real Plan was based on the same 
rationale as the early-1990s economic stabilization 
programmes implemented in developing, and particularly 
Latin American, economies: an exchange-rate anchor 
combined with trade and financial liberalization.
Experience shows that economic stabilization 
programmes based on that rationale nearly always unfold 
in the same sequence: 
(i) First, there is a sharp drop in the inflation 
rate, accompanied by substantial exchange-rate 
appreciation. 
(ii) When the real exchange rate appreciates, as a 
result of the difference between domestic and 
international inflation with the nominal exchange 
rate remaining relatively stable, trade balances 
deteriorate, thereby fuelling balance-of-payments 
current account deficits. 
(iii) These deficits are financed through foreign-capital 
inflows, particularly speculative flows and purchases 
of government bonds.
(iv) The public debt grows, and the cost of rolling over 
payment puts pressure on the public deficit. 
(v) The twin deficits, external and fiscal, reveal the 
inconsistency of “macroeconomic fundamentals” 
in the eyes of the market; and 
(vi) Currency crises break out.
The Real Plan was no exception to this pattern. 
Despite its relative success in controlling the inflationary 
process, import incentives fuelled by trade liberalization 
and exchange-rate appreciation, together with sluggish 
export growth, caused the trade balance to deteriorate 
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rapidly and generated current account deficits. These 
were financed through inflows of foreign venture capital 
or, in particular, portfolio investments; and this in turn 
added to public-sector liabilities.6
The inter-temporal inconsistency of that strategy 
fuelled numerous speculative attacks on the real during 
the second half of the 1990s, nearly all of which stemmed 
from a combination of “contagion crisis” and evidence 
of the macroeconomic imbalances in the Brazilian 
economy, particularly in its external accounts, which 
further aggravated the country’s external vulnerability 
and fragility. By early 1999 the strategy for financing 
the Brazilian economy’s chronic external deficit had 
became exhausted, and economic agents no longer 
trusted the country’s economic policy. There was 
then no alternative but to change the monetary and 
foreign-exchange regime by replacing the currency 
band with a flexible-exchange-rate mechanism and 
implementing a system of inflation targeting. This 
signalled the end of the monetary-stabilization model 
in place until then.
6  Although Brazil’s public deficit was largely financed with external 
capital, this did not increase its external liabilities. The capital inflow 
targeted securities denominated in local currency, broadly indexed 
to the interest-rate and exchange-rate variation. While this strategy 
reduced Brazil’s external-liability exposure to exchange-rate volatility, 
it did not help protect the country’s foreign-exchange reserves from 
speculative foreign capital movements.
Since the application of the Real Plan, monetary 
policy has played an active role, both directly and 
indirectly, in stabilizing the inflationary process: between 
1994 and 1999, it was used to attract external capital flows 
and thus bring the country’s overall external accounts 
into balance (essential for maintaining exchange-rate 
stability); then, following the adoption of inflation 
targeting, it was used to lower the inflation rate to the 
centre of the target range and prevent exchange-rate 
movements being passed through to domestic prices 
(Arestis, De Paula and Ferrari Filho, 2009). In brief, 
throughout the price-stability years, monetary policy 
was conservative, and this generated high interest rates.7
Figure 1 shows the trend of the basic interest rate 
in the Brazilian economy in the period following the 
Real Plan, as an illustration of the argument made in 
the foregoing paragraph. Despite trending downwards 
throughout the period, basic interest rates remained very 
high under both monetary regimes — the exchange-rate 
anchor between July 1994 and January 1999 and inflation 
targeting since June 1999.
7  The aim of using the interest rate depends on the monetary regime 
in force at the time. As noted by Arestis, De Paula and Ferrari Filho 
(2009), in the Brazilian exchange-rate-anchor regime, the interest 
rate was used to keep the external sector in balance. Under inflation 
targeting, basic interest rates were the instrument par excellence to 
attain the targets set by the monetary authority. For further information 
on the implementation of the different monetary regimes see Arestis, 
De Paula and Ferrari Filho (2009).
FIGURE 1





























Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of Institute of Applied Economic Research (Ipeadata) - Macroeconomic data, 2010 [online] http://
www.ipeadata.gov.br.
Note: Between January 1995 and March 1999, average annual interest rates were calculated on the basis of the TBan, which was the basic interest 
rate of the Brazilian economy in force at that time. The other calculations used the Over-SELIC (Special Settlement and Custody System) rate.
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The average basic interest rate in the Brazilian 
economy between 1995 and 2009 was 22.6% per year. 
In the exchange-rate-anchor period, between 1985 and 
January 1999, the rate rose to an annual average of 
33.6%, whereas between June 1999 and December 2009, 
under inflation targeting with a floating exchange rate, 
the average was 16.4% per year. Figure 1 shows that the 
interest rate eased steadily downwards from 2006 on, 
such that between 2006 and 2009 average rates were at 
their lowest level since the Real Plan. There was also 
a substantial fall between 2008 and 2009, as a result 
of the countercyclical monetary policy implemented 
to protect the Brazilian economy from contagion from 
the subprime mortgage crisis. In that context, the basic 
interest rate fell from an annual rate of 13.75% in January 
2009 to 8.75% in the following December, the lowest 
ever recorded in the post-Real Plan period.
As noted above, Keynes (1964) viewed the earning 
of interest as an investment alternative used by economic 
agents to increase their wealth; and for that reason monetary-
policy interest rates are used to influence agents’ spending 
decisions. On this point, Keynes (1980b, p. 276) argued 
that one could not hope to control domestic interest rates 
unless capital outflows from the country were restricted, 
since the interest rate would need to be used to attract 
foreign capital to finance the balance of payments. In other 
words, an interest rate cut could help promote productive 
investments during recession, whereas in upswings the 
interest rate could be used to dampen effective demand 
by economic agents and control inflation.
Between 1995 and 1999, the period of the exchange-
rate anchor with broad capital mobility and a current 
account deficit, the monetary policy interest rate became 
a hostage to speculative pressure from international 
investors seeking a “premium” for investing their wealth 
in Brazil, thereby sustaining the conditions for continued 
management of the exchange rate. In that period, the need 
to keep the exchange rate at levels that would prevent 
potential exchange-rate devaluations from being passed 
through to domestic prices, and to provide an anchor 
for economic agents’ future price expectations, meant 
that the domestic interest rate maintained a substantial 
spread with respect to average international rates.
This spread attracted massive capital flows into the 
country, and the real exchange rate rose in response. One 
of the consequences of this for the Brazilian economy 
was a turnaround in its trade balance, given the need —as 
noted by Bresser-Pereira and Nakano (2003)— to attract 
“external saving” to balance the current account. This 
aggravated external vulnerability, because Brazil’s current 
account deficit was financed largely with speculative 
short-term capital. Moreover, given that monetary flows into 
and out of the country are one of the determinants of the 
monetary base, government bonds were issued to prevent 
capital inflows (typically speculative) being converted 
into reais in the Brazilian economy and threatening the 
recently-won monetary stability. As those bonds were 
mostly indexed to the base rate of interest and, from late 
1990 onwards, also remunerated by the variation in the 
exchange rate, the exchange-rate appreciation also had 
repercussions on public finances via the expansion of 
financial expenses and public debt.
Following the adoption of inflation targeting in July 
1999, the logic of the monetary authorities’ interest-rate 
policy changed in form, but not necessarily in substance. In 
other words, monetary policy ceased to focus exclusively 
on attracting international capital to increase external saving 
and thus keeping the balance of payments in balance, but 
was now also aimed at controlling aggregate demand 
with a view to keeping the inflation rate within the range 
previously set by the inflation-targeting regime. On this 
point, Bresser-Pereira and Nakano (2002) draw attention 
to the excessive number of variables for which the interest 
rate became responsible. These include the exchange rate, 
which required high interest rates both to attract external 
saving and to appreciate the real, thus averting any chance 
of pass-through. Corroborating the idea that, under inflation 
targeting, the interest rate and exchange rate continue to 
work in harness to keep inflation under control, Modenesi, 
Modenesi and Martins (2011) apply a Taylor-rule to the 
Brazilian economy and highlight the importance of the 
exchange rate for defining the interest rate in Brazil during 
the inflation-targeting regime. Meanwhile, Terra (2011) 
stresses the contraction of aggregate demand through the 
issuance of government bonds, as an important element 
in defining monetary-policy interest rates.
To implement its tight-money policy, the central bank 
had to make sure investors ratified the monetary constraint 
by demanding public bonds which, once purchased, 
diverted money into financial circulation and thus made 
it possible to control the monetary base. Thus, monetary 
policy also had to take account of the behaviour of the 
exchange rate, which generated a functional overload 
for the interest-rate and kept it high. As figure 1 shows, 
the price paid by the central bank to achieve that goal 
averaged 16.4% per year. Despite the relative trend 
towards continued appreciation of the real exchange 
rate illustrated in figure 2, the modus operandi of the 
inflation-targeting regime (high interest rates), together 
with exchange-rate float and a backdrop of capital- and 
financial-account liberalization, proved unable to maintain 
nominal exchange-rate stability (see figure 3).
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FIGURE 2













































































































































Real effective exchange rate Nominal exchange rate
Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of Institute of Applied Economic Research (Ipeadata) - Macroeconomic data, 2010 [online] http://
www.ipeadata.gov.br.
FIGURE 3 







































































































































Volatility of the nominal exchange rate Volatility of the real effective exchange rate
Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of Institute of Applied Economic Research (Ipeadata) - Macroeconomic data, 2010 [online] http://
www.ipeadata.gov.br.
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The periods of steepest exchange-rate devaluation 
in the post-1999 period occurred in that same year, when 
the exchange-rate regime was altered; in 2002 in the 
lead-up to the presidential elections, in which expected 
victory by Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva would likely usher 
in changes in macroeconomic policy; and in 2008, as a 
result of the subprime mortgage crisis. Those periods 
aside, the exchange rate tended to appreciate, such that 
in late 2009 the nominal rate was very close to the levels 
prevailing during the exchange-rate-anchor period. 
Figures 2 and 3 show the trend of the real effective and 
nominal exchange rates and the volatility of the exchange 
rate, respectively.
Reliance on external saving to control the balance-
of-payments current account was a constant in the 
post-Real Plan period, except in 2003-2007, when 
burgeoning agricultural and mineral commodity exports 
fuelled a current account surplus. The replacement 
of manufactured exports by agricultural and mineral 
commodities caused a further exchange-rate appreciation 
and created a vicious circle in the export process, by 
hastening the retreat of manufactured and technology-
intensive exports.8
The aforementioned modus operandi of the inflation-
targeting regime, together with its repercussions on 
the exchange-rate appreciation and need for external 
saving, had the effect of fuelling the public debt and 
compromising the public-sector fiscal outturn. This 
reflected the high cost of refinancing that debt, for which 
the parameter is the basic interest rate on government 
bonds used in monetary-policy open-market operations. 
Whereas the central bank’s activities are financed out of 
income received by the National Treasury, the cost of 
monetary policy, noted above, imposes a heavy load on 
public finances. In such circumstances, the public sector 
had no alternative but to finance itself by raising the 
tax burden in relation to gross domestic product (gdp). 
Figure 4 shows the trend of gdp growth and the relation 
between the tax burden and gdp, between 1995 and 2009.
8  Bresser-Pereira (2009) provides a detailed explanation of this 
phenomenon which is known as “Dutch disease”.
FIGURE 4
brazil: annual variation of GDP and tax burden/GDP, 1995-2009
(Percentages)
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Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of Institute of Applied Economic Research (Ipeadata) - Macroeconomic data, 2010 [online] http://
www.ipeadata.gov.br.
Note: End period figures at base values expressed in 2008 prices.
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As shown in figure 4, the annual growth rate 
of Brazil’s gdp was not only low (averaging around 
2.9%) but displayed intermittent volatility throughout 
the period 1995-2009.9 Moreover, the tax burden rose 
continuously in relation to gdp in those years, except 
for minor reductions in 1997, 2000, 2003 and 2009.
According to Keynesian theory, one possible 
cause of the behaviour of Brazil’s gdp could have been 
that contractionary monetary policy and exchange-rate 
appreciation discouraged investment, consumption and 
exports. More specifically, the high borrowing costs 
affect productive investment decisions, through: (i) the 
buildup of involuntary stocks as consumption is squeezed; 
(ii) investor expectations faced by a monetary policy which, 
by exclusively pursuing price stability, has the effect of 
restricting aggregate demand; and (iii) the opportunity 
cost of productive investment and consumption.
The trend towards constant exchange-rate appreciation 
discourages investments in products with greater 
technological content and reduces the cost of importing 
such products from countries with lower production costs, 
such as Germany, China, the Republic of Korea and India. 
By making it more profitable to import technology than 
to produce it domestically, the appreciated exchange 
rate becomes an obstacle to research and development 
(r&d) activities in the country by making it harder for 
Brazilian industry to develop in segments producing high 
value added goods and services. Consequently, domestic 
products of high and medium technology become less and 
less competitive on the international market, rendering 
the country increasingly reliant on agribusiness exports, 
which, while important as generators of foreign-exchange 
earnings, contain little value added.
With respect to public finances in the post-Real 
Plan period, the negligible average growth rate of gdp 
and its volatility made it impossible for the government 
to increase its share in social wealth without raising 
the tax burden. Yet, if the goal of economic policy, as 
expressed in Keynesian theory, had been to stimulate 
wealth creation, the share to be transferred to the State 
would have grown automatically, without the need to 
impose a heavier tax burden on society.
Despite the increased tax burden and the accumulation 
of primary savings virtually throughout 1995-2009 (except 
for 1997), the Brazilian government required nominal 
financing throughout the post-Real Plan period. In other 
9  As an illustration of that volatility, gdp grew at consecutively 
increasing rates in just three years, 2005, 2006 and 2007 — 3.2%, 
4.0% and 6.1% per year, respectively. In the other years of the 1995-
2009 period, gdp growth was negative or occurred at both rising and 
falling rates. 
words, the policy of limiting non-financial expenses in the 
form of public spending and investment (which represent 
primary expenses in the primary public accounts) was 
unable to absorb the large financial expenses incurred by 
the government, and nominal deficits resulted. It is worth 
noting that the existence of constant primary surpluses 
means that the stubbornly high level of interest payments 
cannot be blamed on primary fiscal imbalances. The nominal 
deficits were therefore due to the financial expenses of the 
public sector, which, if not caused by fiscal-policy deficits 
(since there were recurrent primary surpluses) could only 
have been caused by the policy of issuing government 
bonds to resolve the monetary-policy problem, as shown 
in figure 1. Data on the flows of public-sector financing 
needs in the period 1995-2009 are shown in figure 5. 
As shown in the figure, only in 1997 was there a larger 
primary deficit, while in 1996 and 1998, the fiscal outturn 
was in balance. In 1995, and from 1999 onwards, pursuant 
to a requirement of the 1998 agreement for financial 
assistance to be provided by the International Monetary 
Fund (imf), the primary surpluses became substantial and 
grew still further after the government of Luiz Inácio Lula 
da Silva took office in 2003. Nonetheless, the nominal 
deficit and nominal interest payments remained very high 
throughout the period, and only started to fall back after 
2006. In 2009, in response to the international economic 
crisis, the government increased public spending on 
income-transfer policies, such as the Bolsa Família family 
support programme, and instituted subsidy mechanisms 
such as the Minha casa, minha vida (“My home, my life”) 
programme. Those policies to increase public spending 
reduced the primary surplus.
Tax revenues did not fall significantly in 2009 (when 
they represented 34.28% of gdp compared to 34.85% in 
2008), even taking account of the tax exemptions afforded 
to industrialized products. Gobetti and Orair (2010) 
explain this by the increase in revenue obtained by the 
states and municipalities from the Vehicle Ownership 
Tax (ipva) and the Urban Property and Land Tax (iptu). 
In that context, the effect on the public accounts of 
the imbalance caused by financial flows (in view of public 
expenditure on nominal interest payments in relation to 
gdp, as shown in figure 5) was a massive increase in the 
net public sector debt, which surged from 29.0% of gdp 
in 1995 to 52.1% in 2002 (the highest level of the 1995-
2009 period). From then on, Brazil’s net public sector 
debt-to-gdp ratio started to decline, particularly between 
2007 and 2008. This was largely due to the higher annual 
average rate of gdp growth achieved after 2006, and the 
lower interest rates prevailing from then on. Figure 6 shows 
the behaviour of the Brazilian public sector’s net debt.
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FIGURE 5
brazil: primary and nominal financing needs of the public sector  
























Primary outturn Nominal outturn Nominal interest rates
Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of Central Bank of Brazil, “Séries temporais de economia e finanças”, 2010 [Economic and financial 
time series] [online] http://www.bcb.gov.br.
Note: End of period values. Negative values represent a surplus and positive values signify a deficit. 
FIGURE 6


































Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of Central Bank of Brazil, “Séries temporais de economia e finanças”, 2010 [Economic and financial 
time series] [online] http://www.bcb.gov.br . 
Note: End of period values. 
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The peak attained by net public sector debt in 2002 
largely reflects the speculative attack that occurred 
around the time of the presidential elections, which 
were won by Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. With free capital 
movement, the exchange rate depreciated as foreign 
investments withdrew from the country, and the interest 
rate rose to curb the turbulence. In September 2002, 
the nominal exchange rate reached R$ 3.89 per dollar, 
its highest level since the Real Plan. To contain capital 
flight, interest rates were raised and this affected the 
net public sector debt, which was already inflated by 
the exchange-rate adjustment. Consequently, the debt 
level recorded in 2002 lasted into the following year, 
with significant repercussions on the public sector’s 
financial expenses in interest payments (see figure 5). 
After 2004 —as was the case throughout the 1995-2009 
period— the interest rate spread caused by the still high 
interest rates, at a time of international liquidity, pushed 
up the exchange rate despite persistent nominal volatility 
(see figures 2 and 3). 
Based on the data presented above and following 
Keynes’ bipartite budgetary format, it can be said that in 
Brazil there is no notion of a capital budget, but something 
akin to a “financial budget”. Its counterpart, which would 
be the “ordinary budget”, does not offset the expenses 
of the financial budget. Despite the surpluses recorded 
constantly throughout most of the period reviewed, 
cumulative primary saving was unable to keep the public 
sector’s net debt from rising. The deficits incurred by 
the public sector were characterized by their financial 
component, which made them difficult to pay in the 
long term, since no funding sources had been put in 
place when the debts were contracted. Accordingly, no 
structural fiscal adjustment was set up in Brazil.
The requirement to generate primary surpluses 
means financial payments detract from public expenditure 
of the sort that stimulates aggregate demand (public 
consumption and investment). On average, between 1995 
and 2007, interest paid by the public sector represented 
7.8% of gdp per year in real terms; the primary surplus 
absorbed an annual average of 2.4% of gdp and the 
public-sector tax burden was 30% of gdp per year. 
Against that backdrop, nominal interest payments and 
the primary surplus absorbed 23.3% and 8% of total 
public revenue, respectively, which means that 31.3% 
of all public sector income was immobilized and had 
little or no effect on aggregate demand in the Brazilian 
economy, depending on how interest payments were 
distributed. As a result, effective demand was reduced 
on average by the equivalent of 9% of gdp per year 
between 1995 and 2007 (bcb, 2010; Ipeadata, 2010).
Lastly, unlike the Keynesian proposal regarding the 
capital budget deficit —maintenance of entrepreneur 
confidence— the Brazilian government’s (nominal) 
financial deficits do not help sustain employment rates 
or enhance social justice in terms of income distribution. 
The financial deficits originated in interest payments, 
and those payments remunerated rentiers. To the extent 
that the primary surplus represents a resource saving 
to be used to balance the effect of the nominal deficit 
on public finances, albeit only partially, in reality, the 
outcome is a transfer of resources from the population at 
large to government bond-holders, which also makes it 
impossible to improve the country’s income distribution. 
Keynes viewed inequality in the income distribution 
as one of the most serious problems of the capitalist 
system; and improving it was one of the main goals of 
his social philosophy, as set forth in the General Theory 
of Employment, Interest and Money.
2.  were brazil’s countercyclical policies Keynesian?
In response to the international economic crisis that 
broke out in the United States subprime mortgage market 
in late 2007, the Brazilian government implemented 
various measures from the first quarter of 2009 onwards 
(somewhat tardily it could be said), particularly fiscal 
and monetary measures. Fiscal policies included rate cuts 
in personal income tax (irpf), the financial transactions 
tax (iof) or purchases on credit, and the industrialized 
products tax (ipi) for automobiles, electrical appliances 
and construction materials; an increase in benefits paid 
by the Bolsa Família programme; institution of the 
Minha casa, minha vida housing programme; and the 
creation and increase of funding through special and 
subsidized credit lines for agricultural production, the 
purchase of construction materials and infrastructure 
building, among others.
In the case of countercyclical monetary measures, 
the Central Bank of Brazil (bcb): (i) made its rules 
on use and collection of compulsory deposits more 
flexible, to inject liquidity into the domestic money and 
financial market and to finance loans from the Brazilian 
Development Bank (bndes); (ii) streamlined the takeover 
of financial institutions at risk of insolvency by public 
banks, particularly Caixa Econômica Federal and Banco 
do Brasil, and (iii) launched a series of cuts in the basic 
interest rate from January to July 2009, from 13.75% 
to 8.75% (bcb, 2010). 
As noted by Ferrari Filho (2009), between late 2008 
and early 2009 the thesis that Brazilian economy’s was in 
some way immune from the global economic crisis was 
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refuted, because it began to feel the effects observed in 
developed countries despite the countercyclical measures 
implemented. In the wake of the crisis, economic activity 
slowed sharply, with a 0.6% contraction in gdp in 2009, 
following 5.1% growth in 2008. In that period, the main 
indicators of aggregate demand in the Brazilian economy —
investment, consumption and exports— fell drastically: the 
investment rate plummeted by 20.3%, private consumption 
dropped by 1.1%, and exports slumped by 22.1% in the 
first half of 2009 (Ferrari Filho, 2009).
Despite the authorities’ slow reaction to the crisis, 
the fiscal and monetary policies implemented to stimulate 
aggregate demand in the first quarter of 2009 had some 
effect, particularly in terms of reducing unemployment, 
which, having surged from 6.8% in December 2008 to 
9.0% in March 2009, dropped back to 6.8% in December 
of that year. Moreover, no major fault lines appeared 
in the national financial system, as happened in the 
central countries
Nonetheless, the countercyclical policies implemented 
cannot be described as strictly Keynesian. Although the 
outcome, both desired and attained, by the economic 
authorities through these policies displays a Keynesian 
stamp (boosting effective demand countercyclically),10 
10 It might be noted that the countercyclical measures adopted by 
Brazil’s economic authorities are not, in principle, orthodox. 
Keynes visualized a situation of ongoing normality 
in the economic system which, by preventing cycles, 
would enable investors to form better expectations 
about the future and encourage them to forego liquidity. 
In that sense, Keynesian economic policies prescribe 
continuous government action to avoid recessionary 
trends and not, as happened in the case of Brazil, 
government intervention after a crisis has broken out. 
Lastly, government action should not be to remedy 
but to prevent the economic problems inherent to the 
dynamic of monetary economies. In brief, albeit with 
extreme delay and using relatively timid measures, 
such as the modest cut in the basic interest rate, the 
economic authorities had some success in combating 
the crisis. If the Keynesian notion of the State applying 
“permanent automatic stabilizers” to effective demand 
had been conventionally adopted, the dynamic of the 
Brazilian economy would clearly have been less cyclical; 
moreover, the crisis of effective demand suffered by 
the global and Brazilian economies between 2008 and 
2009, would unlikely have been so deep, and it would 
definitely have been shorter. By recognizing business 
expectations as both a causal factor of the crisis and, 
at the same time, the source of the prosperity of the 
economic system, Keynes proposed automatic-stabilizer 
policies to lay firm foundations for entrepreneurial 
action. Laying such foundations should be a constant 
commitment and not a last resort as happened in Brazil.
IV 
conclusions
One of Keynes’ main concerns was to how to promote the 
greatest possible social wealth and ensure its distribution 
among the largest number of individuals. The key 
elements of wealth production are entrepreneurs (and 
their impulses or “animal spirits”), who are continuously 
dealing with the inherent uncertainty of the future. To 
resolve that dilemma, and in keeping with his concern, 
Keynes proposed government intervention to underpin 
entrepreneurial expectations.
In Keynes’ early writings, government intervention 
focused on three areas: monetary, fiscal and exchange-rate 
policy. On the first, he argued that implementing monetary 
policy through the interest rate should avoid crowding 
out productive investment, and thereby avert negative 
effects on the level of investments, which are a source of 
job creation, wealth and income distribution. According 
to Keynes, fiscal policy is the most important sphere of 
government action and is structured around: (i) tax policy 
and (ii) the notion of a bipartite budget, divided into 
an ordinary (current) budget and a capital budget. The 
purpose of the first is to finance basic government services, 
and it should always be in surplus. The second aims to 
strengthen expectations by automatically stabilizing the 
cycles of monetary economies. This budget could be in 
deficit, because it is financed in the short run from the 
surpluses generated in the ordinary budget, and, in the 
long run, from the returns on investments made as part 
of its automatic stabilization functions. As can be seen, 
Keynes viewed budgetary balance as a crucial element 
in the rationale of fiscal policy. Lastly, the monetary 
authority should use the exchange rate under a managed 
floating mechanism, not only to curb speculation, but also 
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to keep the real effective exchange rate stable through 
time, which is essential for boosting export activity and 
preventing exchange-rate fluctuations from being passed 
through to domestic prices.
When this logic is applied to the conduct of 
economic policy in Brazil after the Real Plan, it can 
be seen that both fiscal and exchange-rate policy were 
subordinated to monetary policy, and the monetary 
regime predominated throughout. To keep inflation 
substantially low throughout the 1995-2009 period, 
monetary policy imposed very high interest rates, which 
firstly were inconsistent with sustained economic growth 
and, secondly, imposed a burden on the country’s public 
finances that was incompatible with primary surpluses, 
thereby generating a surge in net public sector debt. 
The high basic interest rates also fuelled exchange-
rate appreciation, a trend that has prevailed throughout 
the post-Real Plan period. In the absence of wide-ranging 
controls on international capital inflows into the country, 
the exchange rate was left to the mercy of external 
speculators’ decisions on how and where to invest 
their savings. Influenced by external motives, such as 
the crisis unleashed by the subprime mortgage market 
in the United States, or by endogenous factors (such 
as the 2002 presidential campaign), economic agents 
engaged in foreign-exchange transactions that caused the 
sharp exchange-rate volatility observed throughout the 
floating-rate period after 1999. The attempt to control 
that volatility during the managed-exchange-rate period 
triggered the Brazilian currency crisis of late 1998 and 
early 1999, when the monetary authority lost control of 
the domestic interest rate.
The economic policies implemented to combat the 
international economic crisis of 2007-2008 cannot be 
classified as Keynesian, either; at most, they involved 
government presence in the equilibrium of the economic 
dynamic, something unimaginable from a conventional 
theoretical viewpoint. The countercyclical measures had 
an ex-post assistance profile, since the aim was to rescue 
the country from the bottom of the pit once the belief that 
the Brazilian economy was ring-fenced from economic 
developments elsewhere in the world had been laid to rest. 
Keynes believed stabilization policy should be permanent, 
because the entrepreneurial investments responsible for 
economic prosperity needed to be constant. The term 
“automatic stabilization” should evoke an economic 
policy action that keeps the economic system on a normal 
course without affecting business expectations. As with 
any volatility in the economy’s basic prices —such as 
the exchange rate, interest-rate, and wages— “stop-go” 
growth of the type seen in Brazil undermines business 
confidence. To promote productive investment in a climate 
of uncertainty, the entrepreneur requires constancy, and 
that is what Keynes proposed with automatic stabilization. 
The economic policies used in Brazil to deal with the 
crisis were last-resort measures, since their objective 
was not to stabilize business expectations, but to rescue 
them. It is no coincidence that Brazil’s gdp shrank by 
0.6% in 2009 compared to the 2008 level.
Lastly, this brief analysis of the economic policy 
implemented in Brazil in the post-Real Plan period shows 
that it lacked the credentials of Keynesian economic 
policies, as described in the second section of this article. 
Why did the economic policies implemented after the 
Real Plan diverge from those recommended by Keynes? 
Here, Minsky (1986, p. 8) aptly notes:
“... economic policy must reflect an ideological 
vision; it must be inspired by the ideals of a good 
society. And it is evident that we are faced with 
a failure of vision, with a crisis in the aims and 
objectives that economic policy should serve” 
(Minsky, 1986, p. 8). 
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